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LEGISLATION-STATUTES IN P ARI MATERIA-AnMINISTRATIVE BoARD RuLINGs-Lane's application for an annuity1 under the Railroad Retirement Act to
the lower adjudicative branches of the Railroad Retirement Board2 was denied.
Lane, by claiming that a "grievance"3 had been created by the railroad's in-

1 "In order to qualify for an annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, an
individual must, on August 29, 1935, the enactment date of the statute, have been either
(a) actively serving an employer; (b) in the employment relation to one or more employers; or (c) an employee representative. Title 45 U.S.C.A. section 228a (b)." Principal
case at 821.
2 Created by Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. L. 307 (1937), 45 U.S.C.
(1946) §228a.
3 ''The purposes of the chapter are: . . . (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Railway Labor Act,
48 Stat. L. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. (1946) §l5la.
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sistence4 that he had voluntarily resigned from its service in 1933, then brought
the matter before the National Railroad Adjustment Board,5 which found that
Lane had been an "employee" of the railroad from 1905 to 1937. When Lane's
case was subsequently heard before the Retirement Board, the findings of the
lower adjudicative branches of the Board were affirmed and the Board held that
it was not bound by the findings of the National Railroad Adjustment Board in
determining whether Lane was entitled to an annuity. On petition to review
the findings of the Retirement Board that Lane was not entitled to an annuity,
held, affirmed. The statutes are not to be read in pari materia for the purpose
of determining who is an "employee'' under the Railroad Retirement Act. Lane
v. Railroad Retirement Board, (6th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 819.
It is a well settled rule of construction that statutes in pari materia should
be construed together so as to avoid inconsistency and conllict.6 However, just
when two statutes are "upon the same matter" is often a difficult question to
determine. 7 The approach commonly used is to hold statutes in pari materia
if they relate to similar matters in purpose, remedies, or rights. 8 A limitation
engrafted on this doctrine of construction in all but the federal courts9 is the
requirement that before the statutes will be construed in pari materia, there first
must be an ambiguity in the statute to be interpreted or an inconsistency between the two statutes. The court in the principal case applies the usual
approach of looking to the subject matter of the statutes in question when it says,
"No rule of statutory construction requires two acts relating to separate and
distinct subjects to be read in pari materia even though they affect the same
general class of persons. An individual may be an employee, as defined in one
act and not an employee, as that term is used in a different statute."10 However,.
there is serious doubt whether this is a proper case for application of the rule,.
4 In order to determine whether the deceased was in an "employment relation," the
Board found it necessary to look to the employer's (The Detroit, Toledo and Ironton Railroad) employment practices.
5 Created by the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
(1946) §153.
6 Daniel v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, 182 Ga. 384, 185 S.E. 696 (1936);
Welsh v. Kuntz, (Md. App. 1950) 75 A. (2d) 343; State ex rel. Lefholz v. McCracken,
231 Mo. App. 870, 95 S.W. (2d) 1239 (1936).
7 See Ahern v. Livermore Union High School, Dist. of Alameda County (S.F. 12925),
208 Cal. 770, 284 P. 1105 (1930), where a statute dealing with a school district's liability
to the public and another dealing with its liability to school children were held not to deal
with the same subject and thus could not be construed together. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY
CoNSTRUCTION §231 (1940).
s United States v. Colorado & N.W.R. Co., (8th Cir. 1907) 157 F. 321; 36 CYc.
1147 (1910).
9 Adams v. Fielding, 148 Fla. 552, 4 S. (2d) 678 (1941); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CoNsTRUCTION, 3d ed., §5201, note 1 (1943); 59 C.J., §620 (2)(a) and §619,d,(l)
(1932). It is doubtful whether such a limitation exists in the federal courts. Once it is
determined that the statutes are in pari materia, federal courts seem automatically to apply
the doctrine; Suwanee Fruit and Steamship Co. v. Fleming, (U.S. Emergency Court of
Appeals, 1947) 160 F. (2d) 897.
10 Principal case at 822, citing Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ry. Employees' Department of American Federation of Labor, (6th Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 340 at 343.
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even if the result is justified. The problem here would not appear to be whether
the acts are in pari materia so far as "employee" is concerned, but rather
whether a finding by one administrative board, subsequent to another board's
finding on the same fact, is binding on appeal from the first board's previous
decision where both boards deal with the rights of the same class of people.
Actually, there is nothing to indicate that Congress had any different concept
of "employee'' in mind in passing the two acts, which were passed in their
original form at the same session of Congress.11 It is submitted that the court
has created a dangerous precedent for the case where a finding from the National
Railroad Adjustment Board had been obtained before petitioning to the Railroad
Retirement Board by laying down such a broad rule in the present case. It
would seem to be a better approach to deal with the problem as one of administrative board jurisdiction rather than one of administrative board power. Such
an approach to the problem would bring about the same result, but the basis
for it would be administrative board res judicata.12 The court cites the provision of the Railroad Retirement Act that the Board's findings on questions of
fact should be conclusive in support of its decision and reasoning, but ignores the
fact that the provision is in the section of the act providing for review of the
Board's decisions by the United States district courts.13 That section in no way
expresses congressional intent in regard to the effect of another administrative
board finding on the same point.14 Emphasis on the doctrine of pari materia may
be perfectly proper in the construction of two statutes creating administrative ·
boards dealing with the rights of the same class of people, but it is suggested
that it is of doubtful validity in considering conB.icting determinations of those
boards.
Robert B. Krueger
ll The Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 was passed on June 27, 1934; the Railway
Labor Act on June 7, 1934. The fact that they were passed in the same session, dealt with
the same class of people, and were passed within such a short time of each other would
seem to indicate a congressional intent that they be considered together and that "employee"
have the same meaning in both. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 is a direct descendant
of the 1934 act, which was adjudged unconstitutional in Railroad Retirement Board v.
Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 758 (1935), and the definition of "employee" and
other definitions are essentially the s~e in the two acts.
12 Particularly should this be true where, as here, the board is of the quasi-judicial
type and its findings of fact are conclusive on appeal in absence of fraud and if supported
by evidence, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §355(f). See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 146, 61 S.Ct. 908 (1941), rehearing den. 313 U.S. 599, 61 S.Ct. 1093 (1941),
where finding of NLRB was held not directly reviewable.
13 "Review of final order of Board on petition to District Courts; costs (f) • • . The
findings of the Board as to facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall
be conclusive." Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 355 (f), incorporated
into the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 by §11 of the act, 45 U.S.C. §228k.
14 An exhaustive search of the CoNG. REc. of 1934, 1935 and 1937 shows no indication of any intent so far as conflicting board rulings or board jurisdiction between the two
boards is concerned.

